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STATEMENT OF IURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1953 as amended) wherein the Court is granted jurisdiction
in appeals from a court of record in criminal cases.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
• Whether the trial court properly admitted Officer DeGraw's testimony
relating to the recorded message?
Standard of Review:

Issues of law are reviewed under a correctness standard,

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994).
• Whether the trial court erred in ruling that questions regarding the
defendant's visitation order were irrelevant?
Standard of Review:

"[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine whether

proffered evidence is relevant and the [appellate court] will find error in a relevancy
ruling only if the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d
769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) cert denied 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1991); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989).
• Whether the trial court erred in denying Denier's motion to dismiss
after the City had presented its case?
Standard of Review: The Court "review[s] the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the
l

jury." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citing numerous cases). The
verdict of the jury will be reversed for insufficient evidence only when the "evidence
... is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted." Id.
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following Utah Rules of Evidence are relevant to the determination of this
matter:
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence".
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence
inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement.
A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant.
A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay.
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
2

the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.
A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the
statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person
made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A)
the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or
(B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth,
or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailablefa] Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in
which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or.
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or.
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement;
or.
[4] is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or.
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable
means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of
the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
3

declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony
is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's
death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the
declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the
accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood,
adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history,
even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the
matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also,
of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or
marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be likely to
have accurate information concerning the matter declare^.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Catherine Samuel (hereinafter "Samuel") and defendant/appellant James
Denier (hereinafter "Denier") have a child in common. At the time of the trial Samuel
had known Denier for approximately fourteen years. Trial Transcript, (hereinafter
TT), 150: 53 (3). Samuel sought and obtained a protective order in 1998. TT
150:102 (1).
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The protective order prohibits Denier from contacting Samuel or having any
one else contact her directly or indirectly. The protective order allows Denier to
contact Samuel regarding visitation. TT 150:108 (18-19).
On or about December 30, 2007, Samuel was at her home located in the
Avenues in Salt Lake City. TT 150: 50 (8). Late that morning several of Samuel's
friends called her after Denier had called them and was not polite to them. They told
her "You need to call him." TT 150:49 (16-19).
Samuel then called Denier to request that he not call her friends (TT 150: 49
(16-17) & 50 (8,17)) and stated that there was "nothing in my order that stipulates
that I have to tell him when I go out of town with my child." TT 150: 49 (5-7) & 150:
60 (10). It was Samuel's weekend with her son. TT 150: 49 (8-10). She also told
Denier that she felt that he was stalking her. TT: 150: 49 (17).
Denier became very angry and screamed and swore when Samuel asked him
not to call her or her friends. He used the F-word and said that he could do whatever
he wanted and he needed to know where Samuel was at all times. TT 150: 50 (1719). Shortly after that conversation Samuel called Denier back and told him that it
was not okay for him to yell or swear at her over the telephone and that she
considered it harassment. TT 150: 51 (8-10).
Denier called back at approximately five twenty on December 30, 2007. TT
150: 51 (16, 21). Samuel did not answer her telephone as she knew Denier would be
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angry, that he would yell at her, that she had been yelled at enough and that he
would leave a message. TT: 150: 52 (7-9). Samuel had not asked Denier to call her
back for anything. TT 150: 52 [10).
Samuel checked her telephone messages a short while later and there was a
message. TT 150: 52 (13).
Samuel, who has known Denier for fourteen years and who had on many
occasions listened to his voice, said that she was familiar with his voice and that the
message on the telephone was from Denier. TT 150: 52 (20-22) & 53 (1-7). She
further stated that she also had caller ID on her telephone. TT 150: 53(10).
On the message Denier left for Samuel, he stated, "I know that this phone call is
being recorded." TT 150: 53(18-19). He then stated, "Go ahead and take me to
court, like you have three or four times in the past eight or nine years. Go ahead and
make a spectacle of yourself because I've always been found innocent." TT 150:
53(20-22). Further he said, "You don't have a protective order, you never have. It
doesn't hold any weight in court because I've always beeli found innocent." TT 150:
53(1-3). He also said referring to the protective order, "it doesn't hold a teardrop of
water." TT 150: 53(3-5).
Samuel said that Denier's call frightened her. She stated that the tone of his
voice was threatening, harassing and angry. Samuel testified that although she did
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not have the recorded message anymore she had a "written recollection" of the
incident. TT 150: 54 (11, 22) 55 (3) & 59(13).
Samuel called the police. Salt Lake City Police Office Degraw responded. TT
150: 68(2-3). DeGraw listened to the message that was left on Samuel's telephone.
TT 150: 69(1).
DeGraw transcribed that telephone message as part of the police report of the
incident. TT 150: 70(9). Per DeGraw, the message indicated that the caller "knew
the telephone conversation was being recorded. He [the caller] was talking about
the complaints that had been filed over the last eight or nine years, and that they'd
all been found false, or his words were that they were found innocent, not guilty. He
[the caller] was talking; he did talk about 'this is about our son, not about you, not
about me." TT 150: 70(2-7).
DeGraw stated that there was no statement or message regarding visitation. TT
150: 71(5-9). The Officer also described the speaker's tone on the message as
contemptuous. TT 150: 70 (22). Further, he stated that he "didn't see anything on
[Samuel's] voice-mail that would allow [Samuel] to edit that message." TT 150:
75(10-11).
Denier stated that he saw his son every Monday and every other Wednesday
and that there was not a precise custody arrangement during the holiday. TT 150:
96(17-19, 20-21). When he did not have custody Denier would talk to his son
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several times a month. Denier would call his son on his c^ll phone. TT 150: 97(1-8,
14-17).
Denier has left messages prior to this incident on Samuel's voicemail. TT 150:
102(8). Denier stated he called his son's friend's father, $am, when he was not able
to contact his son. TT 150: 98(15-20) & 99 (3-6). Denier stated that Samuel had
called him twice on December 30, 2007. TT 150:100(l-l|8).
Denier agreed that the parties had a protective ordgr (TT 150:101(2) & 108:
(13-14)), and that the protective order allowed contact v\rtth respect to visitation. TT
150:101(5-10). Denier admitted that during one of his calls he had spoken "with
Sam and wanted to know where they were and I was ups^t that [Samuel] never told
me that they left the state for the holidays and I had a right to know that." TT 150:
108(13-14).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The statements were properly admitted as it was r^ot hearsay. Even assuming
arguendo that the statements were hearsay they were properly admitted under a
long established exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 804 (]3) (b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding questions
regarding the visitation order as it did not pertain to the protective order violation
and thus not relevant pursuant to Rule 401 and 402 of th£ Utah Rules of Evidence.
8

The trial court did not err in denying the defense motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the prosecution's case as there was
sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury for deliberation.
Finally, any error, if any with regard to questions regarding the visitation
order, was cured when Denier testified regarding the visitation order. TT 150: 96
[17-19, 20-21) & 97 [1-8,14-17).
Denier has failed to show as required that there is a reasonable likelihood of a
result more favorable to him if the hearsay statements had been excluded. "...
Moreover, even if the court erred in admitting the challenged evidence, "we will only
reverse if this error was harmful, 'i.e., if absent the error there is a reasonable
likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant/" State v. Blubaugh, 904
P.2d 688, 699 [Utah Ct. App. 1995) quoting State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 21 [Utah Ct.
App. 1994) [in turn quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 [Utah 1993)).
Given the totality of the evidence presented, there exists no reasonable likelihood
that the verdict would have been more favorable to the Defendant absent the
introduction into evidence of the challenged statements.
//
//
//
//
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED OFFICER DEGRAW'S
TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE RECORDED MESSAGE.

The statements that were recorded and which DeGlraw heard when he
responded to Samuel's residence is admissible and the trial court properly admitted
it. Notwithstanding the fact that the record is silent as to what under what hearsay
exception, if any, they were admitted under and although^ the defense did not
request specificity, the trial court could have properly admitted the statements
under at least two separate prongs (a) that the statements were not hearsay as they
were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted and even if was hearsay
(b) the statement were admissible as Statement against interest

(a) The recorded statement was not hearsay
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prc^ve truth of the matter
asserted. Utah Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rule of Evidence. "When statements are
made not to prove the truth of the statement but to prove the statement was made,
it is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter ass0rted." Defense opening
brief. pl3 citing Salt Lake City v. Alires, 2000 UT App 244 "If an out-of-court
statement is "offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it
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is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay rule/" Id. citing State v.
Olsen, 860 P.2d 335 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a threatening statement to a victim
that he was dead if he testified the next day, in a witness tampering case, was not
hearsay as the statement was not offered to prove the truth of the statement but
simply that the statement was made violating the statute. State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d
512, 514 (Utah 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 958,102 S. Ct. 1469 (1982).
The court in State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983), held that the
defendant statement to a bystander, "I will kill you," to deter him from helping the
police was not hearsay as it was not offered to prove the truth of the assertion.
In this instance the prosecution did not elicit the statements from DeGraw to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Instead the statements were elicited to show
that there were statements left on Samuel's telephone.
Further, the present matter involves a charge of Violation of Protective
Order: the allegation that Denier had made contact with Samuel in violation of a
valid protective order. The protective order allowed limited telephone contact
between the parties to discuss visitation: absent from these statements is a
discussion regarding visitation. Thus, the statements were not elicited to prove
what was said but what was not said.

n

(b1 Statement against interest
Assuming arguendo that this court determines that the statements that
Degraw heard is hearsay, this hearsay meets the requirements of Statement against
interest pursuant to an established exception to the hearsay rule.
Utah Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (3) reads:
Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
Statement against interest A statement withj at the time of its making
so far contrary to the declarant pecuniary ot proprietary interest, or so
far tended to subject the declarant to civil oif criminal liability, or to
render invalid a claim by the declarant agairist another, that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose
the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused
is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement
The statement against interest exception, as with ^11 other exception under
Utah Rule of Evidence 804, initially requires the unavailability of the declarant.
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5; and Utah Rule of Evidence $04. Denier, the defendant
in this case, meets the definition of unavailability pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence
804 (a) (1) as he "exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant'^ statement[.]" See also
State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108,1113 (Utah 1989), as Denier cannot be compelled to
testify against himself.
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The statements that DeGraw heard were that he "knew the telephone
conversation was being recorded. He [the caller] was talking about the complaints
that had been filed over the last eight or nine years, and that they'd all been found
false, or his words were that they were found innocent, not guilty. He [the caller]
was talking; he did talk about 'this is about our son, not about you, not about me"
[TT 150:71 [6-7), was against his penal interest.
Samuel's testimony at the trial prior to Degraw testifying provided
corroboration that was trustworthy as she had heard the statements herself, she
knew Denier for fourteen years, had spoken to him numerous time and knew his
voice. In addition, Samuel had caller ID. Further, DeGraw had testified that the
telephone machine where the message had been left did not allow it to be edited
further ensuing trustworthiness. TT 150: 52 [20-22), 53 [1-7,10) & 75 [10-11).
II.

QUESTIONS REGARDING THE VISITATION ORDER WAS NOT
RELEVANT

Questions regarding the visitation order were not relevant and the trial court
did not err when it excluded such questioning. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on
the admissibility of evidence Utah's appellate court has held that it will not overturn
the court's determination unless it's an "abuse of discretion." State v. Hamilton, 827
P.2d 232 [Utah 1991) citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,120 [Utah 1989). See also
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 [Utah Ct. App. 1991) cert denied, 817 P.2d 327
[Utah 1991).
13

In the case at bar, the transcript of the part of the proceeding dealing with this
issue reads as follows:
ATD:
WIT:
ATP:
JUDGE:
ATD:
WIT:
ATD:
WIT:
ATD:
ATP:
WIT:
JUDGE:
ATD:

ATP:
JUDGE:
ATP:
ATD:
JUDGE:
ATP:

ATD:
ATP:
ATD:

Do you and Catherine, doe^ she ever call you about
issues not related to Conner?
Well she hasObjection.
That doesn't sound relevant counsel, I'll sustain it.
Do you ever leave message^ on her answering
machine?
Yes I have.
Have you done that before*^
Yes, sure I have.
Has Catherine ever called you to go out to dinner?
Objection.
Yes.
Counsel again, I'll sustain that objection. Strike it. It's
not relevant.
Do you recall what your visitation was, the order, on
December 30th? Do you reckll if you could see him for
the holidays specifically?
Objection, I'm not sure in tfye relevance in that either?
I'm sorry?
I'm not sure the relevance ih that?
I think it's absolutely relevant if he should have had
custody of Conner while they were in Colorado.
Um, let me have you approach counsel.
What we are worried about) here is a protective order
violation, what difference dtaes it make if she should
[have] left the child with hiijn or not?
Because inGo ahead.
I think it absolutely goes to her credibility about
whether this incident happened whether this
recording of the time, um, I think that um, it goes as
she said that she was feeling aroused by him after this
phone conversation she was harassed, but I think we
have evidence that she had been contacting him off
and on, she felt threatened ^11 of this and that this
14

JUDGE:
ATD:

JUDGE:

ATD:
ATP:

message left her threatened and that it was related to,
we have evidence that she was calling him out, was
she threatened when she was calling?
The question is was, wasThe question I asked was whether or not he had
visitation, if he called and left a message and was
looking for her it wasn't for harassment and it wasn't
violating the protective order, it was related to their
son and where he was at.
(inaudible) if he called her during this time and asked
her about visitation, if the voice mail he left her had
something to do with that I think it's appropriate. See
that's what we're worried about. So if he, if he can
remember that he called left a voice mail and the
voice mail was her I think I should have him or- I'd let
you ask that.
Okay.
Okay.

T.T 150:102 (1-22), 150:103 (1-22) & 150: 104 (1-4).
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence" as:
evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
And Utah Rule of Evidence 402 reads as follows:
Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable
in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible.

15

Applying the standard set forth in Utah Rule of Evidence 401 and 402, the
trial court properly determined that the visitation order was irrelevant in this
instance as it did not pertain to the violation of the protective order; as the message
left on Samuel telephone did not discuss visitation or custody and thus, inadmissible
pursuant to Rule 402 of the Utah Rule of Evidence.
As previously stated the trial court is well within it|s discretion to exclude
information it considered irrelevant. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah
1991J; State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989). In this instance, the trial court
determined that the visitation order, if any, had no bearing on Denier violating the
protective order.
Finally, any error, if any, was cured when Denier testified that he had
visitation every Wednesday and every other weekend. T.T. 150: 96 (17-18). Denier
had also testified "[a]nd holiday, it's uh. um. I believe it's once or twice out of the
year as far as holidays are concerned: not real precise on that but, we, we just spent
December together." TT 150: 96 (20-22).
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED DENIER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CITY'S CASE

The trial court did not err when it denied Denier motion to dismiss at the
conclusion of the City's case. The defense asserted that "there's insufficient
evidence to go forward and um, put this to a jury" TT 150|: 86 (19-20). In essence
the defense moved for a directed verdict. The Utah Supreme Court in State v.
16

Montoya, 2004 UT 5, said, "[I]n reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed
verdict based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we will uphold the trial
court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be
reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." citing State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1225 [Utah 1989).
Thus, a trial court may deny a motion for directed verdict if the trial court
finds that the prosecution has established a "prima facie case against the defendant
by producing "believable evidence of all of the elements of the crime charged. State
v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, citing State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 [Utah 1992)
[quoting State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 [Utah 1983)). The High Court then stated
that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to prosecution, citing
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, P16.
The defense argued the following in support of its motion to dismiss:
"we have an officer that testified [in] his opinion he didn't think it
was a protective order violation um. [Additionally she called him
twice before and then um, he called her back, and there was
testimony that my client said this is regarding, the, the child. [T]his is
about our son Connor."
TT 105:86 [14-18).
The trial court responded:
"there's certain things that I think make the case worthy. Number
one she admitted to calling Mr. Denier uh, twice before, as you say,
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but on the other hand there's nothing that I'm aware that keeps her
form calling him. Of course, the order prohibits Mr. Denier from
calling her. Um sand so I suppose the jury can decide, well it's hardly
fair to convict the defendant of the crime ^vhen she may have
precipitated it. But on the other hand there's nothing illegal about
her calling him, just him calling her. And, and the call itself the officer
said, and we heard the conversation from both the memory of both
the officer and the complaining witness; It didn't have anything to
do about visitation. [I]t wasn't like can I pjck him up at 10.00 or, or,
can I have him this weekend, it was- the officer did say there was
reference, this isn't about you and me this is about our son, but the
gist of the conversation uh, the officer recalled was that Mr. denier
said, uh, this protective order isn't worth much um, we're tried
before and it hasn't worked-the gist of thq conversation really
focused on the protective order as opposed to visitation so, I deny
the motion.
TT 105:86 (21-22) 87: (1-16).
The trial court in this instance found that there was evidence to submit the
case to the jury. Thus, the trial court correctly denied the defense motion as "[i]f
there is any evidence, however slight or circumstantial, which tends to show guilt of
the crime charged or any of its degrees, it is the trial court's duty to submit the case
to the jury." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 237 (Utah 1991).

NO ERRORS OCCURRED AND THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT
THE DEFENDANT

The trial court correctly ruled and no errors exist. Further, there was
sufficient evidence to convict Denier and so the jury verdict in this matter should
not be set aside.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the "it will review the evidence in
support of a verdict for sufficiency, however that standard of review is very
narrow." State v. Rooker, 709 P.2d 342 (1985). The Rooker court stated:
We review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.
citing State v. Petree, Utah 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v. McCardell,
652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982).
The High Court then said that they will not substitute they judgment for that
of the jury. And added that, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime
can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. Id.
An appellate court will reverse only when the evidence, so viewed is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted. State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175 citing State v. Brown, 948 P.2d
337, 343 (Utah 1997) quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
Further as a general rule, in reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court
assumes that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict. In State v.
Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, the court stated, "[W]e will reverse a jury verdict only
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when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the verdict, we find that the evidence to support the verdict was
completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust, citing State v. Silva, 2000 UT 2^2 P13.
Given the totality of the evidence presented in this instance, there exists no
reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been fayorable to the Defendant
absent the introduction into evidence of the challenged statements. The cumulative
evidence in this case was sufficient such that the admission of the hearsay
statements is unlikely to have affected the outcome of thei verdict. See First Gen.
Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480,485 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). "'[E]ven if we were to
conclude that the evidence here was improperly admitted that would not decide the
issue. We still would have to determine whether the erroit was harmful.'" Id., quoting
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). In thepresent case, the
cumulative evidence against Denier was such that the jurjf would have rendered the
same decision even if the hearsay statements had been excluded.
Again, Utah Appellate court have held that they "v\te will not overturn the
trial court's decision regarding admissibility of evidence Unless it was an abuse of
discretion.... Moreover, even if the court erred in admitting the challenged evidence,
"we will only reverse if this error was harmful, 'i.e., if absent the error there is a
reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to th0 defendant'
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State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) quoting State v. White,
880 P.2d 18, 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (in turn quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1221 (Utah 1993)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff/Appellee respectfully requests that this
court affirm the trial court's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 31* day of August, 2009.

Padraa Veeru-Collings
V
Seniority Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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